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The default approach to the theory of logic programs (and deductive databases) is based on the 
interpretation of negation by default rules. Default logic is a well-suited formalism to express the 
Closed World Assumption and to define the declarative semantics of stratifiable logic programs. 
The case of disjunctive consequences in rules is treated. General logic programs may not have a 
meaning with respect to default semantics. The contribution of the paper is to exhibit an interesting 
class of programs having a default semantics, called effectively stratifiable programs. This time, 
disjunctive consequences are not considered. Effective stratification is a weaker constraint than 
stratification, local stratification and weak stratification. Besides enlarging the class of stratifiable 
logic programs, the paper contributes to provide a constructive definition of well-founded models 
of logic programs. The class of effectively stratifiable logic programs matches the class of programs 
having a total well-founded model and in general, the default semantics extends the well-founded 
semantics. 
1. Introduction 
A general logic program is a set of rules that have both positive and negative 
premises_ Recently, much work has been done in order to develop a semantics for 
general logic programs. The core of the problem is to assign negation as failure a 
declarative, model-theoretic meaning which justifies its use [24]. Two approaches 
have been followed: the "program completion" approach and the "canonical model" 
approach. 
Following the "program completion" approach [10,22], given a general logic 
program P, a theory called the completion of P is associated with P and the negative 
literals that are theorems of the completion of P are the only negative literals 
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derivable by SLD plus Negation as Failure from the initial program. This approach 
has been extensively studied in [2, 22, 31, 32]. One of the weaknesses of this approach 
lies in its "unnatural" behavior for many simple examples [35]. 
Following the "canonical approach", one of the models of the general program 
P is elected to be the model that captures the "intended meaning" of the program 
P. Usually, the "canonical model" of P is selected among the minimal models of 
P. Clearly, the choice of the canonical model of general logic programs highly relies 
on the common sense of the programmer or/and the user of the program. Several 
methods [11,1,7,8,27,23,26,34,3,4,18,35,19] have emerged during the last years 
as better or worse theoretical tools to define the declarative semantics of logic 
programs with negation. All these approaches have in common the following 
problem: a general logic program may not have a canonical model. Besides this, 
for some of these approaches like [7,8,27], it is unclear whether the canonical 
model really reflects the intended meaning of the program. The computational aspect 
of the problem should also be taken into account. 
Classes of programs that have a canonical model, i.e. a clear intended meaning, 
have been exhibited. Stratifiable programs were first introduced in [11] and further 
studied by [I, 34, 27] and others. Stratification restricts the "definition" of predicates 
to be independent of their complement or negation. Stratification can be directly 
and easily determined from the syntax of the logic program. Checking stratification 
can be reduced to checking the existence of cycles in the graph associated with the 
program [t]. The class of locally stratifiable programs [27] includes stratifiable 
programs. Local stratification restricts the definition of atoms of the Herbrand base 
to be independent of their negation. One needs to consider the instantiation of the 
logic program in order to check whether it is locally stratifiable. Moreover, although 
local stratification is of particular interest because it allows one to consider logic 
programs with function symbols, checking local stratification for logic programs 
with function symbols is computationally unreasonable. 
More recently [5, 29, 35], local stratification has been shown to characterize a too 
restrictive class of "well-behaved" programs. As a matter of fact, some very simple 
and useful logic programs, without function symbols, are exhibited [5,29,35] that 
are neither stratifiable nor locally stratifiable but make good sense or in other words 
have a clear intended meaning. 
The aim of this paper is to define a wider class of legal or "well-behaved" logic 
programs. We are thus seeking for a less restrictive constraint than local stratification. 
This condition, called effective stratification, should obviously ensure the existence 
of a canonical model. Intuitively, effective stratification is a refinement of (local) 
stratification in the following sense: in the instantiation of a logic program P, 
irrelevant rules or definitions are discarded and the initial program P is said to be 
effectively stratifiable if the remaining "effective" rules of its instantiation constitute 
a stratifiable logic program. Effective stratification has been introduced in [6]. Given 
an effectively stratifiable program P (that is a program which can be transformed 
by a "sound process" described in the paper into an equivalent stratifiable program), 
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modifying the program by updating the set of facts in P may lead to a program 
which is not effectively stratifiable. In that respect, effective stratification is data 
dependent. 
For logic programs without function symbols, testing effective stratification and 
computing canonical model of effectively stratifiable programs can be performed 
in polynomial time. 
In the paper, the intended meaning of general logic programs is defined using 
the default logic formalism. Default logic has been introduced by [30] in order to 
formalize nonmonotonic reasoning. Previous work [7,8,3,4,5,6] has proved that 
default logic is a well-suited formalism for expressing the Closed World Assumption 
and for defining the declarative semantics of general logic programs including 
disjunction in the consequence of rules. 
In this framework, the declarative analog of the procedural Negation as Failure 
interpretation of negation is negation by default. A general logic program is viewed 
as a particular default theory [30] and its semantics is captured by the extensions 
of that default theory. In [30] extensions of a default theory are defined as fixed 
points of a non-monotonic operator. In fact, as shown in [3,4], extensions of the 
default theory associated with a logic program satisfy a number of good properties. 
First, while in general, extensions of a default theory may not be maximally 
consistent, extensions of logic programs are always maximally consistent. Thus an 
extension of a logic program can be identified with an interpretation. This interpreta-
tion is a model of the logic program and is called a default model in the following. 
Moreover, a default model of a logic program P is a minimal model of P in the 
sense of [9]. Finally, it is in our opinion very important to emphasize that a default 
model of a logic program is supported [1], or equivalently, justified [8]. This last 
property is a very natural property, which one can expect to be satisfied by the 
canonical model intended to capture the meaning of a logic program [1, 7, 4, 35]. 
Note, for instance, that perfect models [28] of a logic program P are minimal for 
P but not always supported for P. 
As for other approaches, a logic program may not have a default model or may 
have more than one default model. In the first case, we say that the program is 
inconsistent and in the second, we say it is ambiguous. Obviously, our interest 
focuses on programs that are consistent and unambiguous or in other words that 
have a unique default model. In [3,4], stratifiable logic programs as well as locally 
stratifiable programs are shown to be consistent and unambiguous. It is also shown 
that for (locally) stratifiable programs, the default logic approach is equivalent to 
three other major approaches (known to be equivalent for stratifiable programs 
[23,27]): the iterative fixed point semantics [1], the perfect model semantics [27] 
and the circumscriptive semantics [23]. 
The paper shows that effectively stratifiable logic programs have a unique default 
model. Effective stratification is a sufficient condition for consistency and unam-
biguity of logic programs. However, some logic programs that are not effectively 
stratifiable but have a unique default model can be exhibited. We would like to 
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insist here on the fact that effective stratification characterizes a subclass of the 
programs having a unique default model and that failure for a logic program to 
satisfy the effective stratification constraint does not entail that this program makes 
no sense (with respect to default semantics). 
Effective stratification is a generalization of sup-stratification [5] and weak 
stratification [29]. Because the perfect model semantics reveals itself to be too weak 
a semantics for capturing the meaning of some not locally stratifiable but "well-
behaved" programs, it has been extended in [29] where weakly perfect models are 
introduced. It is important to note that effectively stratifiable programs may not 
have a weakly perfect model. From a purely semantical point of view, while some 
logic programs have a unique default model but no weakly perfect model, logic 
programs consistent with respect to the weakly perfect model semantics may be 
inconsistent with respect to the default logic approach. Just as perfect models, 
weakly perfect models may not be supported. The notion of (unique) stable model 
introduced in [19] as a new semantics for logic programs is identical to the previously 
introduced notion of default model [3,4]. Finally, it is interesting to see that a logic 
program has a well-founded model [35] iff that program is effectively stratifiable 
while, in general, the notion of default model extends the notion of well-founded 
model. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates the need for relaxing local 
stratification and the choice of default logic as a theoretical tool for defining the 
declarative semantics of logic programs. Section 3 simply recalls some basic concepts 
and notations used throughout the paper. Section 4 formally introduces the constraint 
of effective stratification and investigates its properties. The main result of Section 
4 states that effective stratification entails the existence and uniqueness of the default 
model of a logic program. Finally, Section 5 includes a comparative discussion. 
Weak stratification [29] versus effective stratification, weakly perfect model [29] 
versus default model, stable model [19] versus default model and well-founded 
model [35] versus default model are successively examined. 
2. Motivation 
First we illustrate the limitations of stratification and local stratification. Intui-
tively, stratification and local stratification are two constraints that disallow the 
intentional definition of relations or predicates to make use of their complement or 
negation. Local stratification is a refinement of stratification in the following sense. 
On the one hand, roughly speaking, stratification is a constraint on the predicate 
symbols of the first-order language used to specify a program P; stratification forbids 
a predicate A to be "defined" using its negation in a program P. On the other hand, 
intuitively, local stratification is a constraint on the atoms of the Herbrand Base HBL 
of the language L used to define a program P; local stratification disallows, in the 
instantiation of a program P, an element A(a) of HBL to be "defined" using its 
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negation ,A( a). The following examples illustrate these informal definitions. 
Example 2.1. The following program due to Lifschitz [27] intends to define even 
numbers. 
PI = {EVEN(O), ,EVEN(x) ~ EVEN(successor(x»}. 
The instantiation of PI is given by: 
LPI = {EVEN(O)} u {,EVEN(successori(O» ~ EVEN(successori+l(O» Ii;;;. O}. 
Since the predicate EVEN occurs both in the right· hand side of the second rule of 
PI and negatively in the left-hand side of this rule, the logic program PI is not 
stratifiable. However, it is easy to check that PI is locally stratifiable because in the 
instantiation LPI of the logic program PI, there is no definition of EVEN(suc-
cessor'(O» that depends on ,EVEN(successor'(O». 
We now give an example of a program that is not locally stratifiable but has a 
"well-defined semantics". Several examples of the same kind can be found in 
[35,29, 19]. 
Example 2.2. Our second example is in fact very similar to Lifschitz's example and 
describes a genealogical tree in which each individual inherits a property E every 
other generation. 
P2 = {Father(a, b), Father(b, e), E(a), Father(x, y) /\ ,E(x) ~ E(y)}. 
The instantiation of P2 is given by 
LP2 = {Father(a, a) /\ ,E(a) ~ E (a) (1), 
Father( a, b) /\ ,E(a) ~ E (b) (2), 
Father(a, e) /\ ,E(a)~ E(e) (3), 
Father( b, a) /\ ,E (b ) ~ E (a) (4), 
Father(b, b) /\ ,E(b) ~ E(b) (5), 
Father(b, e) /\ ,E(b) ~ E(e) (6) 
Father(e, a) /\ ,E(e) ~ E(a) (7), 
Father(e, b) /\ ,E(e)~ E(b) (8), 
Father(e, e) /\ ,E(e) ~ B(e) (9), 
E(a) (10), 
Father( a, b) (11), 
Father(b, e) (l2)}. 
The logic program P2 is neither stratifiable nor locally stratifiable. The instanti-
ation LP2 of the program P2 contains, for instance, the rule Father( a, a) /\ ,E (a) ~ 
E(a); this rule defines the atom E(a) using its negation 'E(a). 
Note here that the first-order language used to specify the program P2 does not 
include function symbols. 
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A strong correspondence between the program PI and the program P2 is easy 
to notice. Because the two programs PI and P2 are similar and because the first 
one, program PI, is considered to be "legal" and has a well-defined semantics, one 
naturally expects the program P2 to belong to the class of "legal" programs and 
to have a well-defined semantics. Note that P2 is, to some extent simpler than PI 
because it does not contain function symbols. 
We already have shown that the program P2 is not legal in the sense that P2 is 
not locally stratifiable. Concerning the declarative semantics associated with the 
program P2, it is quite interesting to note here that, following the perfect model 
approach [27], P2 is viewed as an inconsistent or meaningless program: P2 has no 
perfect model. The inconsistency of P2 with respect to the perfect model approach 
is rather unfortunate. Example 2.2 reveals the need to relax the constraint of (local) 
stratification and also the limitation of the perfect model approach. In order to 
associate a semantics with P2, one needs not only to relax the constraint of local 
stratification but also to consider a new semantics. In [29], both an extension of 
the class of (locally) stratifiable programs and a "natural" extension of perfect 
model are proposed. Weak stratification and weakly perfect model will be discussed 
in Section 5. 
On the other hand, following the default logic approach [3,4], the logic program 
P2 is consistent and unambiguous. Indeed, P2 has a unique default model. The 
default model of P2 is {Father(a, b), Father(b, c), E(a), E(c)}. It perfectly matches 
our intuition of the intended semantics of P2 and moreover corresponds to the 
Prolog or SLDNF procedural interpretation of P2. 
Let us now use Example 2.2 in order to intuitively introduce the constraint of 
effective stratification. Clearly, considering the instantiation LP2 of the program 
P2 as a refinement of P2 is not very natural. As a matter of fact, in LP2, rules 
such as (1), (3), (4), (5), (7), (8) and (9) are irrelevant. From a procedural point of 
view, they will never be activated. These rules are not effective rules. For instance, 
rule (1) is irrelevant because one knows that "a" is not his own Father. 
Thus, our goal is, given a program P, to find a "good" refinement of P that 
exclusively contains effective rules. For our example, the good refinement of P2 is 
the set of rules ReLP2 = {(2), (6), (10), (11), (l2)}. Now, given a "good" refinement 
ReLP, the initial program P is "legal" or satisfies the effective stratification constraint 
if no atom A(a) of HBL is "defined" in ReLP using its negation -,A(a), or in a 
simpler way, if the program ReLP is stratifiable. The logic program P2 is effectively 
stratifiable. 
3. Preliminaries 
In this section, we present and review some basic concepts of logic [12, 16, 17], 
default logic [30] and logic programming [2,22]. We also introduce the notations 
used throughout the paper. 
Negation by default in logic programs 91 
From the preceding section, it should be clear that the condition of effective 
stratification will be formally defined for a first-order logic program P by requiring 
some property to be satisfied by (a subset of) the Herbrand instantiation of P. The 
instantiation of a program can be viewed as a propositional program. Thus, in order 
to simplify the further discussion, we restrict our attention to propositional programs 
(in other words, we directly consider instantiations of programs). In the following, 
we denote by Prop a finite set of propositions. 
We deliberately choose not to consider infinite sets of propositions (that intuitively 
would serve to take care of instantiation of first-order logic programs with function 
symbols). A discussion on the infinite case is nevertheless carried on at the end of 
Section 4. 
In order to simplify the presentation, we choose here to stick as much as possible 
with the classical notations of logic programming. In particular, from a syntactical 
point of view, while using default logic, we write a logic program as a set of rules 
rather than as a set of default rules. For the interested reader, [3,4] provide a 
detailed presentation of how logic programs and logical databases can be specified 
by default theories. 
Thus, in the following, a logic program P is a set of rules; a rule r is a formula 
of the form: 
AI" ... "Ap" ,BI " ••• ",Bq ~ C, 
where p ~ 0, q ~ 0 and AI, ... ,Ap , B I , ••• , Bq , C are propositions. We denote by 
Prem(r) the set {AI," ., Ap , ,B I , • •• , ,Bq } of premises of r, and by Cons(r) the 
consequent C of r. 
A literal is a proposition or the negation of a proposition. In the first case, it is 
called a positive literal, in the second case, it is called a negative literal. 
Given a set of literals Lit, we denote by Lit+ (resp. Lie) the subset of positive 
(resp. negative) literals in Lit. Thus, for instance Prem(rt (resp. Prem(r)-) denotes 
the set of positive (resp. negative) premises of r. 
A rule r is called a positive rule if Prem( r) - = 0. 
Given a logic program P, we denote by p+ the subset of positive rules in P and 
by P- the subset of negative rules in P. 
P+={rlrEP and Prem(r)-=0} and P-=P-P+. 
For a set Lit of literals, we denote by '.Lit the set of literals obtained by taking 
the negation of each literal in Lit, that is '.Lit = {,LI LE Lit} (of course, we make 
the convention that "L is L). 
The declarative semantics of a logic program P is defined in [3,4] by means of 
the set of extensions of the default theory associated with P. These extensions are 
defined in [30] as fixed points of a non-monotonic operator. In the following, for 
sake of simplicity, we will use an equivalent definition for default models of P. It 
is straightforward to prove that the definition below is equivalent to the definition 
of a default model as the model of an extension. 
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We make the convention to represent interpretations by maximally consistent sets 
of literals. Given a set of propositions Prop, an interpretation lover Prop is a set 
of literals over Prop such that 
(1) if L is in I then -,L is not in I, and 
(2) if A is in Prop then either A or -,A is in I. 
Intuitively a default model M of P is an interpretation which is able to reproduce 
itself from the negative literals in M and from the rules of P. 
In a slightly different way than in [2], an operator Ep is associated with a logic 
program P as follows: 
Ep(S) = S u {Cons(r)1 rEP and V LE Prem(r), LE S}, 
where S is a set of literals over Prop. An interpretation M is a default model of the 
program P iff M = Ep(M), i.e. iff M is a fixpoint of Ep. 
Another way to express that an interpretation M is a default model of P follows. 
Consider the sequence (M;)(.;oo) where 
Then (note that the sequence (M.)(i;;"o) is an increasing sequence), an interpretation 
M is a default model of the program P iff M = U,,,"o M j • 
A default model of a logic program P is a minimal model of the program P 
considered as a set of clauses. By minimal [9], we mean that the set of positive 
literals is minimized. 
A default model of a logic program P is a supported model of P. This property 
is linked to the fact that default semantics is defined as a fixpoint semantics. The 
notion of supported model has been introduced in [1] and simultaneously in [7, 8] 
where it is called a causal or justified model. Roughly speaking, given a model M 
for a logic program P, a proposition A true in M is supported by P iff there exists 
a definition r of A in P (that is a rule with consequent A) such that each premise 
of r is satisfied by M. A model M for P is a supported model of P iff each true 
proposition A in M is supported by P. 
Note that the converse does not hold: a minimal and supported model of P may 
not be a default model of P. For instance, P = {A -+ A, -,A -+ A} has a minimal and 
supported model M = {A} but no default model because M cannot produce itself 
starting from M- = 0. In fact A is artificially supported by the rule A -+ A. Default 
model semantics does not have this drawback. 
A logic program may not have a default model. It is then called inconsistent. For 
instance, the program {-,A -+ A} has no default model. On the other hand, a logic 
program may have more than one default model. It is then called ambiguous. For 
instance the logic program {-,A -+ B, -,B -+ A} has two default models, namely 
{A, -,B} and {-,A, B}. 
Stratification forbids recursion involving negation. Formally, a program P is 
stratifiable iff there is a sequence S = ProP! ... Prop" such that S is a partition of 
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Prop satisfying: 
Vr E P, Cons(r) E Prop; implies 
V A E Prem(r)+, 3k:s:; i I A E ProPk and 
ViA E Prem(r)-, 3k < i I A E ProPk' 
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Apt et al. [1] show that checking stratification can be reduced to checking the 
existence of cycles in the graph associated with the program. 
In [3,4] the consistency and the unambiguity of (locally) stratifiable programs is 
proved by establishing the existence and the uniqueness of extensions for (locally) 
stratifiable default theories associated with these programs. 
4. Effective stratification 
The contents of this section were outlined in Section 2. We directly proceed to 
the formal presentation. In order to define the constraint of effective stratification, 
given a program P, we utilize some simple properties of propositions for the program 
p. 
Intuitively, a proposition A is defined in a logic program P if A is a logical 
consequence of the positive part of P, i.e. p+ r- A. Now, a proposition A is potentially 
defined in a logic program P if A can be inferred from the rules of P while ignoring 
the negative premises of these rules if any. 
Defi.ition 4.1. Let P be a logic program over Prop. Then: 
(a) Defined propositions in P are recursively defined as follows: 
(1) if A is in P then A is defined in P, 
(2) if 3 r E p+ I Cons( r) = A and VB E Prem( r), B is defined in P, then A is defined 
in P, and 
(3) all defined propositions in P are generated by applying the two above rules. 
The set of defined propositions in P is denoted by Def(P). 
Formally we have Def(P) = U;=t ..... oo E"(0). 
(b) Potentially defined propositions in P are recursively defined as follows: 
(1) if A is in P then A is potentially defined in P, 
(2) if 3 rEP I Cons( r) = A and VB E Prem( r t, B is potentially defined in P, then 
A is potentially defined in P, and 
(3) all potentially defined propositions in P are generated by applying the above 
rules. 
The set of potentially defined propositions in P is denoted by Potdef(P). 
Formally we have: Potdef(P) = Ui=t .... 00 Potd", where 
Potd ~ = Def( P) and for i;;;. 1 
Potd~t = Potd"u {Cons(r) I VB E Prem(rt, BE Potd,,}. 
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(c) A proposition A is undefined in P iff A is not potentially defined in P. The 
set of undefined propositions in P is denoted by Undef(P). 
Undef(P) = Prop - Potdef(P). 
Obviously, since Def(P) is included in Potdef(P), the sets Def(P) and Undef(P) 
are disjoint. 
Before presenting examples to illustrate the previous definition, one should note 
that the notions of defined and undefined propositions proposed above generalize 
the notions of defined and undefined propositions introduced in [5]. 
Let us now illustrate the above definition. 
Example 4.2. Let Prop = {A, B, e, D, E, F, G} and consider the following logic pro-
gram P over Prop: 
P={A, A-+ G, ...,A-+ D, B /\...,e -+ D, A/\...,B /\ ...,D-+ e, E -+ F, F-+ E}. 
Note that P is not stratifiable. 
The proposition A is defined in P because A is in P; hence A is potentially 
defined. The proposition G is defined in P because A -+ G is in P and A is defined 
in P. 
The proposition e (respectively D) is potentially defined in P because the unique 
positive premise A of the rule A /\...,B /\ ...,D-+ e that defines e in P is potentially 
defined in P (respectively because the rule ...,A -+ D, part of the definition of D in 
P, has no positive premise and thus a fortiori each positive premise of this rule is 
potentially defined in P). 
Finally the proposition B (respectively E and F) is undefined in P because there 
is no definition of B in P (respectively because E and F are not potentially defined 
in P). 
Example 4.3. Let Prop = {A, B, e} and consider the following logic program P over 
Prop: 
P = {A -+ B, B -+ A, ...,A -+ e, ...,e /\ B -+ A}. 
Note that P is not stratifiable. 
The set of defined propositions in P is empty. The proposition e is potentially 
defined in P because the rule ...,A -+ C that defines e in P has no positive premises. 
The propositions A and B are undefined in P. 
The following result shows that, given an interpretation M, the sequence (M;)(i~o)o 
used to check whether M is a default model of P, contains all the defined propositions 
in P and also that all propositions in that sequence are, at least, potentially defined 
in P. 
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Lemma 4.4. Let P be a logic program over Prop, let A be in Prop and let M be an 
interpretation. Let us consider the sequence (M;),;;,o where Mo = M- and Mi+1 = 
Ep(M;) for i ~ O. Then: 
(i) if A E Ui~O ..... oo Mi then A is potentially defined in P, 
(ii) if A is defined in P then A e Ui=O ..... oo M" 
Proof. (i) Let A be a proposition in Ui~O ..... oo Mi' We show by induction on i that 
A E Potdef(P). Since A is a proposition, A cannot belong to Mo. 
(i = 1): If A E M 1 , then A is the consequent of a rule having no positive premise 
and thus A E Potdef(P). 
Induction step: Assume that for each i ~ k and for each proposition B, if BE Mi 
then BEPotdef(P). Consider AEMk+1 such that 3rEP, A=Cons(r) and VLE 
Prem( r), L E M k • By induction hypothesis, V L E Prem(r)+, L E Potdef( P). Thus 
A E Potdef(P). 
(ii) Let A be defined in P then A E E~(0) for some k and by induction on k, we 
have that A E Ui=O ..... oo M" 
Thus Def(P) ~ Ui=O ..... oo Mi' 0 
Intuitively, if a proposition A is defined (respectively undefined) in the logic 
program P then one can reasonably expect the proposition A to be true (respectively, 
to be false) in the default model of P, if such a model exists. This property results 
from the preceding lemma. 
Theorem 4.5. Let P be a program over Prop, let A be in Prop and let M be a default 
model of P. Then: 
(i) if A E M then A is potentially defined in P, 
(ii) if A is defined in P then A EM, 
(iii') if A is undefined in P then -,A E M. 
Remark 4.6. It is interesting here to compare the notion of potentially defined 
proposition and the notion of supported proposition. Recall that a model M of P 
is a supported model iff for each true proposition A in M there exists a rule r in 
P with consequent A such that each premise of r is satisfied by M. Clearly, the 
notion of potentially defined proposition is weaker than the notion of supported 
proposition in the following sense: if A is true in M, where M is a supported model 
of P, then A is potentially defined in P. Besides, it should be recalled that a default 
model M of a logic program P is a supported model of P. Thus property (i) of 
Theorem 4.5 is immediate. 
Proof. (i) and (ii) follow immediately from Lemma 4.4 and from the definition of 
a default model. 
(iii) In order to see that -,A E M if A is undefined, where M is a default model 
of P, we use property (i) and the fact that M is an interpretation, that is, a maximally 
consistent set of literals. 0 
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For propositions that are potentially defined but not defined in a logic program 
P, nothing can be said about their "truth value" before one knows the default model 
of P. For instance, the program P of Example 4.2 has a default model M = 
{A, ,B, C, ,D, ,E, ,F, G}; the proposition C is potentially defined in P and "true" 
in M and the proposition D is potentiaIly defined in P and "false" in M. 
We now define two basic operations that transform a logic program into another 
one. The Reduction of P with respect to a literal L removes the premise L from 
each rule in P. The Simplification of P with respect to a literal L deletes each rule 
in P having L among its premises. 
Definition 4.7. Let P be a logic program over Prop and L be a literal. Then: 
Reduce(P, L) = {rl S E P, Prem(r) = Prem(s) - {L} and Cons(r) = Cons(s)}, 
Simplify(P, L) = P-{rl LE Prem(r}}. 
These two transformations correspond to Davis-Putman transformations [14] 
defined for sets of clauses. 
Example 4.2 (continued) 
PI = Reduce(P, A) = {A, G, ,A~ D, B A ,C ~ D, ,B A ,D~ C, E ~ F, 
F~E}, 
P2 = Simplify(PI, ,A) 
= {A, G, B A ,C ~ D, ,B A ,D ~ C, E ~ F, F ~ E}, 
P3 = Reduce(P2 , G) = Simplify(P2 , G), 
P4 = Reduce(P3 , ,B) = {A, G, B A ,C ~ D, ,D~ C, E ~ F, F~ E}, 
Ps = Simplify(P4 , B) = {A, G, ,D~ C, E ~ F, F~ E}, 
P6 = Simplify(Ps, E) = {A, G, ,D -+ C, F ~ E}, 
P7 = Simplify(P6 , F) = {A, G, ,D~ C}. 
Before formally stating the properties satisfied by Reduce and Simplify, we extend 
these operations in order to deal with sets of literals rather than with a single literal. 
Definition 4.8. Let P be a logic program and S be a consistent set of literals. Then, 
the Reduction of P with respect to the set S of literals is recursively defined by: 
Reduce(P, 0) = P, 
Reduce(P, S) = Reduce(Reduce(P, S -{L}), L) for some Lin S. 
• 
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In the same manner, the Simplification of P with respect to the set S of literals is 
recursively defined by: 
Simplify(P, 0) = P, 
Simplify(P, S) = Simplify(Simplify(P, S - {L}), L) for some L in S. 
The nature of each transformation, Reduction and Simplification, implies that 
their application to sets of literals is totally independent of the order of the elementary 
transformations performed with a single literal. 
We now define the effective operator that transforms a logic program P by 
Reduction and Simplification with respect to the sets of defined and undefined 
propositions in P. 
Intuitively, if a proposition A is defined in P then: 
• on the one hand, an occurrence of A in the premise of a rule r is "solved" by 
the fact that "A is true for P" and thus the premise A may well be removed from 
the rule r without changing the meaning of the program P, 
• on the other hand, an occurrence of ,A in the premise of a rule r is "unsolvable" 
because "A is true for P" and thus the rule r may well be removed from the 
program P without changing its meaning. 
In the same manner, if the proposition A is undefined in P then (recall A is 
"false") removing ,A from the premises of each rule in P produces a program 
equivalent to P and deleting the rules in P having A among their premises also 
produces a program equivalent to P . 
Definition 4.9. Let P be a logic program over Prop. The effective operator denoted 
by EFF is defined by: 
EFF(P) = Simplify(Reduce(P, Def(P) u ,.Undef(P)), ,.Def(P) u Undef(P». 
Although in general Simplify and Reduce do not commute (consider the logic 
program P = {,B~ A}, then Simplify(Reduce(P, ,B), ,B) = {A} and Reduce(Sim-
plify(P, ,B), ,B) = 0), note that in the definition of EFF the order of application 
of the two transformations is irrelevant because Simplify and Reduce have disjoint 
arguments concerning sets of literals. 
The effective transformation EFF(P) of P preserves the defined and the undefined 
propositions in P. 
Property 4.10. Let P be a logic program. Then: 
(i) if the proposition A is defined in P then the proposition A is defined in EFF(P), 
that is Def(P) S;; Def(EFF(P), and 
(ii) if the proposition A is undefined in P then the proposition A is undefined in 
EFF(P), that is Undef(P) s;; Undef(EFF(P)). 
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Proof. (i) It can be easily shown by induction on n that E~(0) s; EFF(P) for n ~ 1. 
(ii) In order to prove that Undef(P) S; Undef(EFF(P» we prove that Pot-
def(EFF(P» S; Potdef(P). Let us first note that if A = Cons(r) with r E EFF(P) then 
3 r' E P such that Cons(r /) = Cons(r) and (Prem(r')+ - Prem(rt) s; Def(P) s; 
Potdef(P). Hence if we know that Prem(r)+ S; Potdef(P), then we can deduce that 
Cons(r /) = Cons(r) E Potdef(P). Using this fact it is straightforward to show by 
induction on n that Potd~FF(p) s; Potdef(P), where (Potd~FF(p)n"l is the sequence 
of potentially defined propositions in EFF(P) associated with EFF(P). 0 
Moreover, the effective transformation EFF preserves the semantics of programs. 
Theorem 4.11. Let P be a logic program. Then, P and EFF(P) are two equivalent 
logic programs, that is M is a default model of P iff M is a default model of EFF(P). 
Proof. In order to show that the programs P and EFF(P) are equivalent, it suffices 
to show that, given an interpretation M, M is a fixpoint of Ep iff M is a fixpoint 
of EEFF( P). As a matter of fact, since the order of elementary transformations Reduce 
and Simplify is irrelevant, we show that: 
(1) An interpretation M is a fixpoint of Ep iff M is a fixpoint of Ep. where 
P' = Reduce(P, Lo) and Lo is either a defined proposition in P or the negation of 
an undefined proposition in P. 
(2) An interpretation M is a fixpoint of Ep iff M is a fixpoint of Ep. where 
P' = Simplify(P, Lo) and Lo is either the negation of a defined proposition in P or 
an undefined proposition in P. 
Let us prove (1), Assume first that M is a fixpoint of Ep. By definition of Ep', 
M,= Ep.(M). Now let us consider A = Cons(r/) such that r' is in p' = Reduce(P, Lo) 
and V L E Prem( r/), L E M. Then, either r' is in P or there exists a rule r in P such 
that A = Cons(r) and Prem(r) = Prem(r/) u {Lo}. Now, by Theorem 4.5, because Lo 
is either a defined proposition in P or the negation of an undefined proposition in 
P, LoE M thus V LE Prem(r), LE M and Cons(r) = Cons(r/) = A is in Ep(M) = M. 
This implies that Ep.(M) S; M. In conclusion, M is a fixpoint of Ep·. 
Assume now that M is a fixpoint of Ep', By definition of Ep, M S; Ep(M). Now 
let us consider A = Cons(r) such that r is in P and V LE Prem(r), LE M. Two cases 
arise. If r is in p' = Reduce(P, Lo) then immediately A is in M. Now if r is not in 
p' = Reduce(P, Lo), then there exists a rule r' in p' such that Cons(r) = Cons(r/) 
and Prem(r)=Prem(r/)u{Lo}, Thus VLEPrem(r), LEM implies that VLE 
Prem(r/), LE M and Cons(r) = Cons(r/) = A is in Ep.(M) = M. Thus Ep(M) C;; M. 
In conclusion, M is a fixpoint of Ep. 
Let us now prove (2). Assume first that M is a fixpoint of Ep(M). By definition 
of Ep', M C;; Ep.(M). Now let us consider A = Cons(r/) such that r' is in p' = 
Simplify( P, Lo) and V L E Prem( r/), L E M. Then, r' is in P and A = Cons( r/) is in 
Ep(M) = M. Thus Ep.(M) C;; M. In conclusion, M is a fixpoint of Ep·. 
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Assume now that M is a fixpoint of Ep', By definition of Ep, M ~ Ep(M). Let 
us consider A = Cons( r) such that r is in P and V L E Prem( r), L E M. Assuming 
that r is not in P' = Simplify(P, Lo) implies that, Lo is a premise of r and either -,Lo 
is defined in P or Lo is undefined in P. Thus by Theorem 4.5, the negation of Lo is 
in M which leads to a contradiction with V L E Prem( r), L E M. Thus r is in P' and 
A = Cons(r) is in Ep,(M) = M. Thus Ep(M) ~ M. In conclusion, M is a fixpoint of 
Ep. 0 
At this point of the discussion, we are able, given a logic program P, to construct 
an equivalent program EFF(P} by utilizing the set Def(P) of defined propositions 
in P and the set Undef(P} of undefined in P. The new program obtained is 
syntactically simpler (and semantically equivalent to P). It contains less rules or 
rules with less premises. As suggested in Section 2, the idea is to construct from P 
a program equivalent to P and to get rid of as many as possible ineffective rules in 
P. If we examine the program P of Example 4.2, the program P7 obtained by one 
application of the effective operator EFF on P, does not contain ineffective rules 
any more. As a matter of fact, note that P7 is a stratifiable program. However, in 
the general case, ineffective rules may remain after one application of the effective 
operator EFF. An example of such a program is given below. 
Example 4.12. Let us consider the logic program P defined as follows: 
P = {AO, -,BO-+ AI, -,AO-+ AO, -,AI-+ AI, -,AI-+ BI}. 
In the program P, AO is defined, AI, BI are potentially defined and BO is undefined. 
Thus, EFF(P) = {AO, AI, -,AI-+ AI, -,AI-+ BI}. In EFF(P), the two last rules are 
ineffective rules. In fact Al is defined in EFF(P) and EFF(EFF(P» = {AO, AI} 
does not contain any more ineffective rules. In this case, EFF2(P) is even a very 
simple program containing only facts. 
This leads us to consider successive applications of the effective operator EFF. 
Definition 4.13. Let rand s be two rules. Let P and P' be two logic programs. Then: 
(i) r~ s iff Cons(r) =Cons(s) and Prem(r) ~ Prem(s). We say that rsubsumes s. 
(ii) P fii. P' iff Vr E P - P' 3s E P' - P, r::::;; s. 
(iii) The sequence EFFi(P) is defined by EFpO(P) = P and for i ~ 0, EFF'+1(P) = 
EFF(EFFi(P)}. 
Intuitively at step i + 1, EFFi+I(p) is obtained by Reduction and Simplification 
of EFFi(P) using the defined and undefined propositions in EFFi(P). 
Property 4.14. Let P be a logic program. Then: 
(i) the relation .., defined among logic programs over Prop is a partial order, 
(ii) EFF(P)!ii P, 
(iii) there exists i such that EFFi(p} = EFF'+1(P}. 
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Proof. (i) and (ii) are obtained by using the fact that we consider finite programs. 
In order to show (iii) let us define the size of a program P as the number of symbols 
occurring in P and let us denote it by IPI. Clearly if Pn + 1 Iii Pn and Pn;c Pn+1 then 
O~ IPn+11 < IPnl. fiii is a well-founded ordering among finite programs. From (ii), it 
follows that if EFF'(P);c EFF+1(P) then O~ IEFF'+I(p)1 < IEFFi(P)I. Hence there 
is some j such that EFF1(P) = EFF)+I(p). 0 
In the following, we denote by EFF"'(P) the logic program EFFi(P) such that 
EFF'(P) = EFFi+I(p). 
We are now ready to define a new class of "well-behaved" logic programs. 
Definition 4.15. Let P be a logic program. Then, P is effectively stratifiable iff there 
exists i such that EFFi (P) is stratifiable. 
Theorem 4.16. Let P be a logic program. P is effectively stratifiable entails that P has 
a unique default model M and M = EFF"'( P) u ,.( Prop - EFrc( P». 
Proof. The proof is immediate. From [3,4], we know: EFF'(P) stratifiable implies 
that EFF'(P) has a unique default model and from Theorem 4.11, we have that P 
and EFF'(P) are equivalent. Thus P has a unique default model. Now clearly, if 
there exists i such that EFF' (P) is stratifiable then EFF"'( P) is a set of positive 
literals whose unique default model is Def(EFF"'(P» u ,.Undef(EFrc(P» = 
EFrc(P) u ,.(Prop- EFFOO(P». 0 
Example 4.2 (continued). The logic program P of Example 4.2 is effectively 
stratifiable because EFF(P) = P7 is stratifiable. Note that EFF""'(P) = EFF2(P) = 
{A, C, O} and that the unique default model of Pis M = {A, ,B, C, ,D, ,E, ,F, O}. 
We have exhibited a class of consistent and unambiguous logic programs that 
strictly includes the class of (locally) stratified programs with negation. Before 
showing with an example that the class of effectively stratifiable programs is a strict 
subclass of the class of logic programs that have a unique default model, we show 
that the class of effectively stratifiable programs cannot be augmented by deletion 
of subsumed rules. 
Given a logic program P in which r subsumes s, deleting the rule s from P in 
order to simplify P is a very elementary and attractive idea. In fact: 
Proposition 4.17. Let P be a logic program. If r subsumes s in P then P and P - {s} 
are equivalent logic programs (with respect to the default semantics). 
The proof is obvious and omitted here. 
First of all, it is clear that the effective operator EFF does not eliminate subsumed 
rules (see Example 4.18). However, it is important to note here that combining 
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deletion of subsumed rules with the two other elementary transformations of Reduc-
tion and Simplification has no effect on the definition of effectively stratifiable logic 
programs. 
Example 4.18. Consider the following logic program. 
P = {--,A 1\ --,B ~ e, --,B ~ e, --,e ~ A, --,e ~ B}. 
The program P is irreducible: A, Band e are all potentially defined propositions 
in P and none of them is defined in P. Thus EFF(P) = P. The first rule --,A 1\ --,B ~ e 
in P is subsumed by the second one --,B ~ C. Note that the logic program P is not 
(effectively) stratifiable and that the logic program P' = {--,B ~ e, --,e ~ A, --,e ~ B} 
obtained by removing the subsumed rule --,A 1\ --,B ~ e from P is irreducible and 
not (effectively) stratifiable. 
Deletion of subsumed rules does not augment the class of effectively stratifiable 
logic programs. In order to formally state this, we introduce an operator Sub on 
logic programs to eliminate subsumed rules. 
Definition 4.19. Let P be a logic program. Sub(P) is the subset of P such that: 
(i) "ir, r' E Sub(P) r does not subsume r', 
(ii) "irEP 3r'ESub(P) r is subsumed by r' (Le. r'os;;r). 
Note that sub(P) !!iii P . 
• 
Now, we consider the sequence (sub-effi(p»);",o defined by 
sub-e~(P) = Sub(P), 
sub-eff'+I(p) = Sub(EFF(sub-eff' (P»), for i;;. O. 
Recall that EFF( P) !!iii P. Therefore (sub-eff' (P» i"'O is a decreasing sequence of finite 
programs and thus there existsj such that sub-eff)(P) = sub-effj+l(p). Let us denote 
by sub-etr"(P) the first element sub-effj(p) of the sequence (sub-effi(p»,;;.o such 
. +1 that sub-eW (P) = sub-eff) (P). 
Theorem 4.20. Let P be a logic program. If sub-etr"(P) is a stratifiable program then 
P is effectively stratifiable (i.e. EFFOO ( P) is stratifiable). 
Proof. First we show that Vj 3; Sub(EFF'(P»!!iiisub-effj(p). This can be easily 
established by induction on j by using Property 4.14 and the two straightforward 
• properties: 
(1) Def(P) = Def(Sub(P» and Undef(P) = Undef(Sub(P», 
(2) Sub(EFF(P» !!iii EFF(Sub(P» (note that the converse is not true). 
It follows from this that Sub(EFF"'(P»!!iii sub-etr"(P). 
Now clearly, if PI is stratifiable and if P2 !!iii PI then P2 is stratifiable. Thus if 
sub-etr"( P) is stratifiable then Sub( EFFOO ( P» is stratifiable. It remains to show that 
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EFF""(P) is stratifiable. Def(EFF""(P» = Def(Sub(EFF""(P))), Undef(EFF""(P» = 
Undef(Sub(EFFOO(P») and EFF""(P) irreducible entail that Sub(EFF""(P» is 
irreducible. Now because Sub( EFF""( P» is irreducible and stratifiable, each proposi-
tion is either defined in Sub(EFFOC(P» (and thus in EFF""(P» or undefined in 
Sub(EFF""(P» (and thus in EFF""(P». Consequently EFF""(P) is stratifiable. D 
We now show that the constraint of effective stratification is a sufficient but not 
a necessary condition for the uniqueness of default model of logic programs (with 
respect to the default logic semantics). The next example presents a program P 
which is not effectively stratifiable but has a unique default model. 
Example 4.21. Let us consider the following logic program: 
P = {-,A ~ B, -,C ~ A, -,B i\ -,A ~ C} (Prop = {A, B, C}). 
The program P is irreducible, i.e. EFF""(P) = P because Def(P) and Undef(P) 
are both empty. P = EFFOO(P) is obviously not stratifiable. However, the logic 
program P above has a unique default model, namely {A, -,B, -,C}. 
Let us show quickly that the default model associated with P captures the intended 
meaning of P. In fact here, because the first rule -,A ~ B is the only rule having B 
in its consequence, the negative premise -,A of the third rule can be "replaced" by 
B. The third rule becomes -,B i\ B ~ C. This latter rule is irrelevant and can thus be 
removed. We end up with a program of the form {-,A ~ B, -,C ~ A} that is stratifiable 
and has a unique default model namely {A, -,B, -,C}. 
• 
We briefly suggest how the previous definition of effectively stratifiable programs 
could be extended in the case where the logic program P is an infinite set of rules 
defined over an infinite set Prop of propositions. Intuitively, an infinite propositional 
program corresponds to the instantiation of a first-order logic program with function 
symbols. 
Thus we could consider Definition 4.15 to be extended in the following straightfor-
ward way: P is effectively stratifiable iff there exists an ordinal a such that EFFa(P) 
is stratifiable, where EFFu (P) = greatesLlower_bound( {EFFtI(P)/ f3 < a}). 
The problem encountered here is that, given a logic program P, it may happen 
that the ordinal a such that EFFU(P) is stratifiable is above w. Such a situation is 
of no interest for practical reasons. As written in [35], "iterating even to w takes 
too long". In [6] we propose two examples of first-order logic programs with function 
symbols: the closure ordinal of the first program is w while the closure ordinal for 
the second one is w + 1. 
Proposition 4.22. Let P be a first-order logic program with functions. Then, P is locally 
stratifiable entails that P is effectively stratifiable. 
Indeed, if P is locally stratifiable then the instantiation of P is stratifiable, and 
thus effectively stratifiable. That locally stratifiable programs have a unique default 
model is shown in [3,4]. 
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An algorithm for testing effective stratifiability for a logic program P is provided 
in [6J. It is a forward procedure that generates Def( P) and Potdef( P), and propagates 
defined and undefined propositions in a breadth-first fashion. (It is analogous to 
the linear algorithm proposed by [13J for testing the satisfiability of propositional 
Horn formulae.) 
It is worth noting that this algorithm computes the default model of an effectively 
stratifiable program in polynomial time, while determining in general whether a 
logic program has a default model is a NP-complete problem [6J. 
S. Comparison with other approaches 
In this section, we briefly compare the class of effectively stratifiable logic programs 
and the class of weakly stratifiable logic programs [29J. We also discuss weakly 
perfect model semantics [29J, unique stable semantics [19J and well-founded seman-
tics [35J versus the default logic semantics for logic programs with negation. 
5.1. Weak stratification and effective stratification 
As pointed out in Section 2, the perfect model semantics is unable to capture the 
intended meaning of some simple and very useful logic programs which are not 
(locally) stratifiable but still have a clear intended meaning. In [29], a new semantics, 
called weakly perfect model semantics, is introduced as a natural extension of 
perfect model semantics and the class of weakly stratifiable programs is proposed 
as enlarging the class of locally stratifiable programs. As for perfect models and 
stratification, the definition of weakly perfect models is strongly linked to the 
definition of weak stratification. 
In order to properly carryon our comparative study, we need to briefly recall 
here the definitions of weakly perfect models and weakly stratifiable programs [29J. 
In the following, P is a logic program defined over the set Prop of propositions. 
We define the precedence graph Gp associated with P as follows. There exists a 
positive (respectively negative) edge from B to A in G p iff there exists a rule r in 
P with Cons(r) = A and B is in Prem(rt (respectively B is in Prem(r)-). 
Definition 5.1 (przymunsinska and Przymunsinski [29]). (1) The dependency (or 
priority) relations < and "'" between elements of Prop are defined by 
(i) A"", B iff there is a directed path from A to B, and 
(ii) A < B iff there is a directed path from A to B passing through a negative edge. 
(2) The equivalence relation = between elements of Prop is defined by 
A = B iff A = B or (A < Band B < A). 
Equivalence classes are called components of the graph G p and a component is 
trivial if it consists of one point. 
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(3) A relation < is introduced between components of the precedence graph Gp : 
Cl < C2 iff C1;c C2 and 3A E C1 3B E C2 such that A < B. 
This relation induces a partial order. A component C 1 is minimal if there is no 
component C2 such that C2 < C1 . 
(4) The bottom stratum S(P) of P is the union of the minimal components of Gp • 
(5) The bottom layer L(P) of P is the subprogram consisting of rules whose 
consequents belong to the bottom stratum S(P) of P. 
Intuitively, given a logic program P, its weakly perfect model is defined as follows. 
First, the bottom layer L(P) of P is considered and the least model of L(P) is 
computed. Then, this least model of L(P) serves to prune the initial program. The 
process is iterated by considering the bottom layer of the new simplified logic 
program, .... 
In order to make the formal definition clear, let us recall some technical definitions. 
Let P be a logic program defined over Prop, a model M of P (that is, a maximally 
consistent set of literals over Prop satisfying P) is the least model of P iff the positive 
part of M is equal to the intersection of the positive parts of all models of P, that 
. M+ n M'+ IS, = M'modelofP • 
Recall that if P is a positive logic program (a program without negation), then 
P has a least model. Otherwise, P may not have a least model. 
In the following definition it is assumed that in P, there is no rule that is subsumed 
by a unit rule in P (a unit rule is a proposition). If it is not the case, these subsumed 
rules are removed from P. 
Definition S.2 (Przymunsinska and przymunsinski [29]). (1) Let Po = P, Propo be 
the set of propositions having no occurrence in P, Lo = ° and No = ...,.Propo. Then, 
for k> 0, let Pk, Lko Propko Nk be defined by the following: Pk is obtained by 
removing from Simplify(Reduce(Pk _ t , N k - t ), ...,.Nk - t ) all the rules whose con-
sequents are in N k - t , Lk = L(Pk ), ProPk is the set of propositions occurring in Lk and, 
if Pk = 0, then Nk = Nk- t else 
if the program Lk over ProPk has no least model then Nk = Nk- t 
else Nk is the least model of the program Lk over ProPk' 
Now let k be such that Nk = Nk+ 1 and let N p = U.=O .... ,k N •. 
if Pk = 0, then N p is the weakly perfect model of P, and 
if Pk ;c 0, then N p is the partial weakly perfect model of P. 
(2) P is weakly stratifiable iff 
(a) all of its strata Sj (i;;:.1) consist only of trivial components or, equivalently, 
(b) all of its layers L. (i;;:. 1) are positive logic programs. 
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Remark 5.3. The above definition of weak stratification is ambiguous simply because 
the statements (a) "all of its strata Sj consist only of trivial components" and (b) 
"all of its layers L, are positive logic programs" are not always equivalent. To see 
that (a) and (b) are not equivalent, it suffices to consider the logic program 
Po={,A~A}. 
Following the alternative (a) of the definition, the program is weakly stratifiable. 
Its stratum S) = {A} is a trivial component. Following the alternative (b) of the 
definition, the program is not weakly stratifiable because the layer L) = Po = {,A ~ A} 
is not a positive program. 
In the following, we assume that weak stratification is defined by (b) and compare 
the class of effectively stratifiable programs and the class of weakly stratifiable 
programs. 
Proposition 5.4. Let P be a propositional logic program. Then, if P is weakly stratijiable 
and N p is the weakly perfect model of P then P is effectively stratijiable and N p is the 
unique default model of P. 
Sketch of proof. In order to prove Proposition 5.4, it suffices to show that each 
proposition true (resp. false) in N p is a defined (resp. undefined) proposition in 
EFFOO(P). Assuming this is the case, then: 
• on the one hand, because N p is maximally consistent, EFFOO(P) = N~ is 
stratifiable, thus P is effectively stratifiable, and 
• on the other hand, because P is effectively stratifiable, by Theorem 4.16, the 
default model of P is equal to Def(EFpCX>(P» u ,.Undef(EFpCX>(P» = EFpCX>(P) u 
,.(Prop- EFFOO(P» and thus N p is the default model of P. 
Showing that each proposition true (resp. false) in N p = U,=O ..... k N, is a defined 
(resp. undefined) proposition in EFFOO(P) is done by induction on i, for each N,. 
The proof is easy and omitted here. 0 
This proposition follows also from other results presented at the end of this section. 
Example 5.6 presents a logic program that is effectively stratifiable but not weakly 
stratifiable. This example shows that: 
Theorem 5.5. The class of effectively stratijiable logic programs is strictly larger than 
the class of weakly stratifiable logic programs. 
Example 5.6. Consider the program of Example 4.3 
P= {A~ B, B~A, ,A~ C, ,C" B~A}. 
(1) Def(P)=0; Potdef(P)={C}; Undef(P)={A,B}. Thus EFF(P)={C} is 
stratifiable and the program P is effectively stratifiable. Its default model is 
{,A, ,B, C}. 
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(2) P has a unique minimal component {A, B, e}. The bottom layer L(P) of P 
is P itself and is not a positive logic program. Thus P is not weakly stratifiable. 
Since the bottom layer L(P) = P of P has no least model the partial weakly perfect 
model of P is empty and P has no weakly perfect model. 
The gap between the class of effectively stratifiable programs and the class of 
weakly stratifiable programs is explained by the gap between the set of defined or 
undefined propositions in a program P and the contents of the minimal components 
of the graph Gp associated with the program P. For instance, in the case of Example 
5.6, the analysis of the precedence graph G p does not allow to isolate the propositions 
A and B from the proposition e (all three propositions are in the connected 
component of the graph). The notion of potentially defined propositions allows us 
to exhibit that although the definition of A depends on the negation of e and the 
definition of e depends on the negation of A, there is no chance that the rule 
-, C " B -+ A could be activated. This is due to the fact that the rule -, e " B -+ A 
defining A using -,e uses B positively and to the fact that A and B are mutually 
positively dependent. This leads us to say that A and B are undefined in P. 
5.2. Weakly perfect model semantics and default model semantics 
While some effectively stratifiable programs have no weakly perfect model, there 
are, as shown by the following example, some logic programs that are not weakly 
stratifiable, still have a weakly perfect model, but do not have a default model. 
Example 5.7. Consider the following logic program P 
P={-,A-+B,B-+A}. 
(1) The propositions A and B are both potentially defined in P. EFF(P) = P and 
thus P is not effectively stratifiable. It is easy to see that P has no default model. 
(2) P has a unique minimal component {A, B}. 
The bottom layer L(P) of P is P itself and is not a positive logic program. Thus 
P is not weakly stratifiable. However the bottom layer L(P) = P of P has a least 
model N p = {A, -,B} which is the weakly perfect model of P. 
In fact in the preceding example, negation is interpreted as first-order negation. 
The weakly perfect model N p is in fact the least model of {A vB, -,B v A}. It seems 
to us that it can be confusing to deal with (that is difficult to understand and also 
to manage) a logic program containing two kinds of semantics for the same symbol 
of negation. 
Note also that, although N p is a minimal model of P, it is not a supported model 
of P. Roughly speaking this means that N p cannot reproduce itself from the rules 
in P. 
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Now we compare the default model semantics with the stable model semantics 
and the well-founded semantics. 
5.3. Stable model semantics and default model semantics 
First we show that stable models introduced in [19] as a new semantics for logic 
programs are equivalent to default models. The default model semantics was pre-
viously introduced in [3,4]. The equivalence of default models and stable models 
is not surprising. The definition of the former is based on default logic [30], while 
the definition of the latter is based on another nonmonotonic logic, namely 
autoepistemic logic [25]. Recently, Konolige [20] has shown the equivalence of 
default logic and autoepistemic logic. 
We recall the definition of stable model. 
Definition 5.8 (Van Gelder et al. [35]). Let P be a propositional logic program and 
let M be a model of P. Let M' be defined by the following three transformations: 
(1) Define PI = TJ(P, M) to be the transformation by which every rule with a 
negative premise that is inconsistent with M is discarded; the output of the transfor-
mation is the set of rules that remain. 
(2) Define TAP) to be the transformation by which all negative premises are 
dropped from rules of P, leaving a Horn program. We call P2 = T2 ( TJ (P, M», the 
reduction of P with respect to M. 
(3) Form M', the minimal model of P2 = T2 ( TJ (P, M», in the sense of [33]. By 
"minimal", we mean the set of positive literals is minimized. 
Call M a stable model if M = M'. 
Theorem 5.9. Let P be a logic program. M is a stable model of P iff M is a default 
model of P. 
Proof. Note that if a rule in P has a negative premise which is inconsistent with 
M, then this rule cannot be used in order to construct E~(M-). In other words, 
E~(M-) = E~,(M-). 
If each negative premise of a rule of PI is consistent with M, i.e. if each negative 
premise of a rule of PI is in M-, then clearly the consequent of this rule is in 
E~,(M-) iff it is in E~2(M-). 
Since P2 is a Horn program, E~2(M-) = E~2(0) u M-. Let M' be the minimal 
model of P2 • The set of positive literals of M' is U,=o .... 00 E~2(0) [2]. Therefore the 
set of positive literals of M' is U,=o ..... oo E~2(M-) - M- = U,=o ..... oo E~(M-) - M-. 
From this we deduce that M' = M iff M = U,=o ... oo E~(M-), that is M' is a stable 
model of P iff M' is a default model of P. 0 
In [35], stable models are compared with well-founded models. This comparison 
applies to default models versus well-founded models because of the equivalence 
between default and stable models. These results are recalled below. In the following 
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we enrich the comparison with a new result. Effective stratification characterizes 
the class of logic programs that have a 2-valued well-founded model. 
5.4. Well-founded semantics and default model semantics 
In order to present well-founded models, we recall the concept of unfounded sets. 
Definition 5.10 (Van Gelder et al. [35]). Let S be a set of propositions and 1 be a 
consistent set of literals (also called a partial interpretation). S is an unfounded set 
of P with respect to 1 if each A in S satisfies the following. For each rule r in P 
such that Cons(r) = A, (at least) one of the following holds: 
(1) there is an L in Prem( r) such that L is in 1.1, i.e. L is inconsistent with the 
partial interpretation I. 
(2) there is a Bin Prem(r)+ such that B is in S. 
As noted in [35], a literal that makes (1) or (2) true is a witness of unusability 
of the rule r (with respect to I). 
We restrict the general definition of well-founded models given in [35] to the 
case where only finite propositional programs are considered. The well-founded 
model of P is defined as the limit of a sequence of partial interpretations. This 
sequence is constructed starting from the empty interpretation by iteratively adding 
to it consequents of rules whose premises are in the current partial interpretation 
and the negation of the propositions in the greatest unfounded set of P with respect 
to the current interpretation. 
Definition S.H (Van Gelder et al. [35]). Let Up be the operator defined over sets 
of literals by: Up(I) = I.G, where G is the greatest unfounded set of propositions 
of P with respect to I. Let us consider the sequence of sets of literals (h) k,.O defined 
as follows: 10 = 0 and for k ~ 0, Ik+1 = Ep(h) u Up(Id where Ep has been defined 
in Section 3. Note that each h is consistent and the monotonic sequence (Ikh,.o 
reaches a limit 1* after a finite ordinal. If I* is maximally consistent then 1* is a 
model of P called the well-founded model of P; otherwise I* is called the well-founded 
partial model of P. 
Result 5.12 (Van Gelder et al. [35]). Let P be a logic program. 
(a) Any stable model M (and any default model M) of P contains the well-
founded partial model 1* of P. 
(b) If P has a well-founded model M then M is the unique stable model (and 
M is the unique default model) of P. 
(c) If P is locally stratifiable, then it has a well-founded model which is identical 
to the perfect model of P (i.e. to the unique default model of P). 
We will show that this last result can be generalized to effectively stratifiable logic 
programs (Theorem 5.15). 
Negation by default in logic programs 109 
Just as we have defined Undef(P) as the complement of Potdef(P), we can 
introduce the set of potentially founded propositions in P with respect to I, denoted 
by Potfound(P, I) as the complement of the greatest unfounded set of P with respect 
to I. 
Definition 5.13. Let Potfound(P, I) be the set of potentially founded propositions in 
P with respect to I. Potfound(P, I) = U,=o ..... oo Potf(P, I);, where 
Potf(P, 1)0 = {Cons(r) IrE P, Prem(rt = 0 and V L E Prem(r)-, L e -l.l} 
Potf(P, 1)'+1 = Potf(P, I)' u 
{Cons(r)lrE P, VLEPrem(r)Le-1.l and 
VB E Prem(rt BE Potf(P, I)'}. 
It is important here to note that the notion of potentially founded propositions 
is the dual of the notion of unfounded propositions. 
Theorem 5.14. Let P be a logic program. Then 
(1) Potdef(P) = Potfound(P, 0), and 
(2) Up(I) = 1.(Prop - Potfound(P, 1). 
Proof. The proof of (1) is immediate. 
In order to prove (2), we proceed in two steps. First we show that I. Up(I) and 
potfound(P, I) are disjoint and then we show that (Prop - Potfound(P, I) is an 
unfounded set of P with respect to I. This immediately leads to the conclusion that 
I. Up(I), the greatest unfounded set of P with respect to I, is equal to Prop-
potfound(P, I). 
In order to prove that I. Up (I) and Potfound(P, I) are disjoint, we show by 
induction on j that if A E Potf(P, I)' then A e I. Up(I). The initial step (i = 0) is 
immediate. Assume that for i ~ k, A E Potf(P, I); implies A e I. Up(I) and let us 
consider A E Potf(P, I)k+l. Then there exists a rule r in P such that Cons(r) = A, 
VLE Prem(r) Le 1.1 and VB E Prem(rt BE Potf(P, I)k. By induction hypothesis, 
we have VB E Prem(rt Be,. Up (I) and thus A e I. Up(I). 
Now let us prove that Prop - Potfound(P, I) is an unfounded set of P with respect 
to I. Let A E Prop - Potfound( P, I), let r be a rule in P such that Cons( r) = A. Then 
because Ae Potfound(P, I), either there exists LE Prem(r)+ such that 
Le potfound(P, I), i.e. there exists L E Prem(r)+ such that L E Prop - Potfound(P, 1) 
or there exists LEPrem(r) such that LEI.I. Thus Prop-Potfound(P,1) is 
unfounded. 0 
It is important to note here that the sequence (Potf(P, 1););,,"0 provides a construc-
tive definition of the greatest unfounded set of P with respect to a partial interpreta-
tion I and thus a constructive definition of the well-founded model of P. 
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It is also interesting to note that effective stratification characterizes the class of 
logic programs that have a (total) well-founded model. 
Theorem S.IS. Let P be a logic program. P is effectively stratijiable iff the well-founded 
partial model of P is a well-founded model. Moreover, for effectively stratijiable 
programs, default model and well-founded model coincide. 
Proof. In order to prove this result, we are going to slightly modify the way 
well-founded models are defined. This modification provides a sequence of interpre-
tations which is exactly the sequence of sets of defined plus undefined propositions 
• 
in the programs EFF'(P). 
Let P be a logic program. Let (Ii )(i~0) be the sequence defined in Definition 5.11. 
Recall that the limit of this sequence is denoted by I*. Now let us consider the 
sequence (Ji)(i~O) defined by: Jo=0, and J'+I = Ep tw(Ji)u Up(J,) for i~O, where 
Ep tw(Ji) = Uk= 1 •...• 00 E~(Ji)' Note that, because Ep and Up are monotonic, the 
sequence (Ji)(i;'O) is increasing. We denote by J* the limit of this sequence. 
Let us now show that these two sequences have the same limit, i.e. that 1* = J*. 
Clearly, because Ep and Up are monotonic, Ii ~ Ji for each i ~ O. (This is obviously 
true for i = 0, and then, I, = Ep(Ii-l) u Up(l,_I) ~ Ep(J,-I) u Up(Ji_l) ~ Ep tW(Ji-l) u 
Up(Ji-l) = Ji.) Hence, 1* ~ J*. 
It remains to show that for each i, J, ~ J*. This is straightforward from the fact 
that I* is the limit of the sequence (1')(';;00) and thus Ep tw(I*) = J* and Up(I*) = J*. 
(It suffices to notice that Jo ~ J*, and to proceed by induction.) Thus J* = J*. 
Now in order to conclude, it suffices to establish the correspondence between the 
sequence (Ji)(,~J) and the sequence (Ki)(i~J) defined by 
Ki = Def(EFF i - 1(P» u I.Undef(EFF'-'(P». 
We naturally proceed by induction. 
(i = 1): On the one hand, Theorem 5.14 entails that Undef(P) = I. Up (0). On the 
other hand, by definition of Def(P), we have Def(P) = Ep tw (0). Thus, K, = J1 • For 
the induction step it suffices to show that given a program P and J = Def(P) u 
I.Undef(P), Def(EFF(P» = Ep tw(l) and I.Undef(EFF(P» = Up(I). This is 
immediate from the definitions of EFF, Def, Potdef and Up. 
Thus the sequences (J;)('~I) and (Ki)(I"'J) are the same. This immediately gives 
that P is effectively stratifiable iff the well-founded model of P is total (maximally 
consistent) and that, if P is effectively stratifiable, its default model is equal to its 
well-founded model. 0 
Remark 5.16. It is shown in [29] that every weakly stratifiable program has a 
well-founded model and that its weakly perfect model is also its well-founded model. 
From this and from Theorem 5.15 we again obtain Proposition 5.4. 
However the well-founded semantics and the default semantics do not completely 
match. The example below due to [35] proposes a logic program that has an empty 
partial well-founded model but does have a default model. 
• 
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Example 5.17. Consider the following logic program: 
P = {-,B -+ A, -,A -+ B, -,C -+ C, -,B -+ C}. 
(1) The set Def(P) of defined propositions in P and the set Undef(P) of undefined 
propositions in P are empty. EFF(P) = P is not stratifiable and thus P is not 
effectively stratifiable. However P has a unique default model M = {A, -,B, C}. 
Roughly speaking, if M is a default model of P then C has to belong to M because 
of the third rule (because it is impossible to have -,C). Now, we need to justify 
that C is in M. This can be done using the last rule and assuming B to be false. 
Finally, assuming that B is false is consistent with the program and the truth value 
already assigned to C. The first rule entails that A is in M. The second rule of P is 
not used. 
(2) The greatest unfounded set of propositions of P with respect to the empty 
partial interpretation is empty. Nothing can be derived using P from the empty 
partial interpretation. Thus the partial well-founded model of P is the empty set. 
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